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Labour Contracts and Performance of Cameroonian Firms
* 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate employees’ productivity in relation to their contract status. 
This study uses (a) survey data collected among manufacturing sector firms, having more 
than 15 employees, in Cameroon between April and May 2006 and (b) information issued by 
the National Institute of Statistics. Information collected concerned 45 firms spanning the 
period 2003 to 2005. This study uses the stochastic production frontier, distinguishing 
employees holding fixed-term contract (FTC) from employees that do not have fixed-term 
contracts (indefinite-term contract (ITC)). Results are estimated in 2 stages. First, we 
evaluate the determinants of the utilisation of FTC workers and second, we estimate the level 
of efficiency and productivity of two types of workers. Empirical results indicate that 
employees holding FTC are twice more productive than those holding ITC. Likewise, 
parameters indicating returns to scale are 1.3. This parameter, though not significant, is 
greater than one indicating constant returns to scale in the firm production function. 
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An analysis of issues associated to Labour markets reveals its capacity to reduce 
unemployment. According to the neo-classical school, this objective is achieved via the 
flexibility of wages. These wages are defined following the confrontation of the supply and 
the demand for labour. Thus, any unemployment is voluntary. It is within the framework of 
the theories of implicit contracts, wage efficiency, trade unions, minimum wage, and many 
others that involuntary unemployment will be conceived. This unemployment will be 
explained by the rigidity of the labour market, which is generally due to the rationality of 
actors in the labour market. With the inability of wages to suppress unemployment, public 
policies are oriented towards the reduction of labour costs rather than wages. These policies 
concern the reduction of taxes associated to the factors of labour, regulation of minimum 
wage, costs of dismissal and the introduction of fixed-term contracts (FTC) or any other form 
of precarious employment. These new policies have mixed effects on the macroeconomic 
results, especially on unemployment (Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). If at the macroeconomic level the 
consequences of the labour contracts on the job market are debatable, we can ask ourselves 
how they affect actors of the labour market at the levels of firms (microeconomic level).  
Since the end of the 1980s, one of the most important characteristics of labour contracts is its 
duration. This duration can be fixed or undetermined. Cameroon, especially in 1992, has 
witnessed reforms relating to labour market.  The main objective of the 1992 reform was to 
improve on the performance of companies. Unfortunately, these reforms resulted in the 
increase of precarious jobs. The increase in the number of employees under a FTC has been 
widely studied (Booth et al., 2002a). However, the questions often treated by researchers 
relate on one the hand to the impact of temporary contracts on unemployment and job creation 
(Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2002), and on the other hand, to the microeconomic effect of precarious employment on wages, on-the-job training, or the 
transition from precarious employment to permanent contract in the labour market (D’Addio 
and Rosholm, 2005; Güell and Petrongolo, 2007). Very few studies have examined the effects 
of precarious contracts on the performance of companies. Two serious problems arise in 
relation to two analytical approaches. Whereas the first approach lays emphasis on the effects 
of FTC on the reduction of production costs (Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; 
Goux et al., 2001) in order to control uncertainties due to the demand of goods and services, 
the second focalizes on the stimulating nature of FTC (Ichino and Riphanh, 2001; Engellandt 
and Riphanh, 2005; Tsafack Nanfosso and Fomba Kamga, 2011). The main objective of this 
paper is to measure the effect of FTC on the performance of firms in Cameroon, notably its 
productivity. Specially, this paper seeks to (a) identify the determinants of FTC in 
Cameroonian firms; (b) compare the productivity of workers under FTC and those under 
indefinite-term contract (ITC) and; (c) determine the efficiency of Cameroonian firms as well 
as their return to scale.  
This paper contributes to knowledge in three ways.  By positioning itself in the extension of 
microeconomic analysis of labour contracts, especially FTC initiated by Booth et al. (2002), 
this study is one of the first in developing countries in Africa, situated south of the Saharan. It 
also adds to the little number of works carried out on microeconomic labour contracts. 
Likewise, this work uses the production function to evaluate productivity differentials 
between temporary and permanent workers. Finally, it takes into consideration the 
endogenous nature of the rate of FTC workers in determining production frontier.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews labour market reforms and 
stylistic facts about in Cameroonian firms. Section III outlines the related literature. Section 
IV presents the methodology, data used in this study and descriptive statistics. Section V 
indicates results and section VI concludes this study. 2.  A review of labour market reform and stylistic facts about Cameroonian 
firms 
2.1.  Labour market reform 
The Labour Code currently in force in Cameroon is the result of a procedure which started 
since 1952, before independence. 
2.1.1.  From the Labour Code of 1952 to the Labour Code of 1974 
After the code of 1952, instituted by colonial authorities, law-makers successively 
promulgated other codes in 1967, 1974 and 1992. The provisions of previous codes especially 
that of 1974, are rigid concerning labour contracts. Initially, Article 30 subparagraphs 2 of the 
1974 code provided that “if the contract is concluded for a limited duration, this duration 
cannot exceed two years”. As for subparagraph 3, it laid out that “When the two-year period 
envisaged above is exceeded and employment continues beyond such date, the fixed-term 
contract becomes an open-ended contract… ”. The ITC was thus the norm and the FTC an 
exception. A review of these codes indicate that, conditions for dismissal were constraining, 
especially in terms of notice, allowances, administrative procedures, among others.  The crisis 
witnessed by Cameroon since the 1980s and the requirements of the various adjustment 
programs, caused firms not to respect the 1974 code (Tjouen, 1996). Beyond the fact that this 
code was considered to be rigid, it was often considered by employers as a source of 
inefficiency. An improvement of the labour market, regarding more flexibility, was desired by 
local employers as well as international financial institutions, particularly IMF and the World 
Bank (Pougoué, 1991).  
2.1.2.  The 1992 Labour Code 
The 1992 code was an extension of the wind of liberalism which blew across Africa and 
Cameroon in particular since 1990, with law n°90/093 of December 19, 1990. This code was 
aimed at improving the flexibility of the labour market and to enhance the competitiveness of 
firms. This ambition was materialized by modifications related to trade unions, with negotiations concerning employment relationships. Thus, the FTC which was an exception in 
1974 code became legal, accompanied by employment forms different from permanent 
contracts or ITC. These forms of employment differ by their duration, their degree of 
attachment to the firm and their number of renewals.  
The 1992 code made it possible for a firm in Cameroon to have these various forms of 
employment in the following ways:  
First, the employees working for the firm without being under its administrative responsibility 
can either be recruited by a drudge or sub-contractor company. Cameroon Labour Code 
defines the drudge as a sub-contractor who recruits the necessary labour itself, signs a written 
contract with a contractor for the execution of a certain task or the provision of certain 
services for a lump sum payment. 
Secondly, temporary work companies are organized by Decree N° 93/572/PM of July 15, 
1993. These companies provide firms (user enterprises) with employees for a period which 
should not exceed 12 months, with the possibility of renewing the contract once. The 
“temporary work contractor” relates to the worker by a labour contract and to the user by a 
provision contract. The contract between the temporary work company and the user must 
include the following elements: the reason for the recourse to temporary work; the term of the 
provision includes, as appropriate, a clause envisaging the possibility of modifying this term, 
the description of the post to be occupied specifying its characteristics and the needed 
professional qualification; and the place of execution and schedule. The contract between the 
employee and the “temporary work company” must be written and the qualification of the 
employee clearly indicated, compensation details, modes of payment, and the possibility for 
the user to hire the employee at the end of the labour contract. The worker is not paid by the 
user but benefits from social protection measures and their wages must take into account the 
condition of seniority in the temporary work company.  Thirdly, employees working for the firm under its direct responsibility can either be recruited 
for an unspecified, a specified period or just for part time. These categories of employees 
differ on several points: (a) in the degree and the duration with which the administrative 
control of the firm is exerted. While temporary employees and ITC are under the total 
administrative control of the employer, part-time employees partly escape this control; (b) 
part-time employees can have a permanent or temporary status and be perceived as a sub-
group of ITC or FTC employees, everything depending on the number of working hours per 
day/week. Apart from the number of hours of work per day and/or week, relationships with 
the firm differ by the duration, the written character or not of the contract, and the possibility 
of becoming permanent. 
These changes in negotiation, the conclusion and the performance of labour contracts were 
followed by changes in the organisation and the functioning of trade unions. The 1992 labour 
market reform was preceded by the “Neutrality Declaration” of trade union organisation in 
1991, which helped distinguish trade union organisations from political parties and public 
administration. Negotiations relating to work relationships which where directed by the 
government were henceforth carried out in a tripartite framework. Workers were henceforth 
expected to negotiate directly with companies without any government intervention, except as 
an arbitrator. 
2.2.  Stylized facts on the Cameroonian industry sector 
After independence in 1960, the industrialization strategy designed to replace importations 
enabled the Cameroonian manufacturing sector to record a growth rate of 9.7% between 1961 
and 1979 (Tybout et al., 1996). This sector suffered the severe crisis experienced in Cameroon 
since 1987. The level of employment deteriorated between 1985 and 1992, with a 19% 
decline in the food industry and 38% in the manufacturing industry, although this decline was 
limited to the exportation of semi-processed products (Cogneau, 1993). At the same time, 
average growth rates in this sector were negative between 1990 and 1999, ranging from -5% in 1990 to -1.8% in 1999. Table A1 indicates that the contribution of the manufacturing 
industry to the GDP remained below that of the tertiary sector. From 1993 to 2006, the share 
of the manufacturing industry in the GDP growth rate remained stable around 12% while the 
tertiary sector reached 42% in 2003.These results contrasted with those of countries with high 
growth rates and with a proportion of manufacturing in the growth rate above 30% such as 
Botswana, Ghana, China, Brazil and Ecuador (World Bank, 2006). 
The workforce in Cameroon has steadily increased since 1993 from 3.8 to 6.5 million 
between 1993 and 2003. The share of industry in employment is between 10% and 13%, 
while the agricultural sector remains above 60% as shown in Table A2. Table A3 reveals that 
private employment grew at an average annual rate of over 5% between 1993 and 2003, 
representing approximately 95.8% of total employment, with only 6.7% of workers in the 
formal sector. Formal private employment sector has experienced a steady decline in numbers 
at an average annual rate of -7.4% between 1993 and 2003 due to the reform of the labour 
market in 1992.  Within the same period, the public sector recorded a net loss of 71,000 jobs 
because of layoffs and hiring freeze.  The distribution of payroll by industry reveals that the 
tertiary sector is the main distributor of wages in Cameroon with 35.7% of payroll. It is 
followed by the secondary sector which provides 25.3% of payroll. The primary sector is last 
with 7.5% of payroll. The primary sector, the main provider of employment, at the same time 
records the lowest wages level; the average annual wage was 280,000FCFA. The secondary 
sector (tertiary respectively) is 506,000 FCFA (FCFA 611,000 respectively). 
3.  Literature review 
Work contracts affects business performance through production cost and the productivity of 
factors of production. The fixed-term contracts (FTC) allow the company to manage demand 
fluctuations in consumer goods and services market by minimizing the adjustment
1 costs of 
the number of employees (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994). Thus, in periods of expansion, the 
                                                            
1 Adjustment costs include employment and lay-off costs. firm may hire employees under fixed-terms and they can be dismissed without costs during 
periods of recession. Beyond this numerical flexibility, FTCs allow the firm to acquire a 
functional flexibility, which will facilitate access to expensive expertise (Christensen, 1991). 
Numerical flexibility and functional flexibility allow the firm to manage its payroll and 
increase profits.  
In addition, using workers under FTCs increases the productivity of firms, hence their 
business performance. In this context, considering their situation as a stepping stone or as an 
extension of the selection process, FTC employees can be more productive than those on ITC 
(Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). Notwithstanding, the working conditions of FTC employees are 
generally very poor with low wages compared to those on ITC (d'Addio and Rosholm, 2005) 
and generally without any form of social security. These elements result in locating the 
temporary employees on the secondary market, those having an ITC being on the primary 
segment. Under such conditions, one admits with the theory of wage efficiency that temporary 
employees are more willing to skiver, thus reducing their productivity. From the above 
remark, it is evident that the explanation of the relation labour contracts and performance of 
the firm via the incentive to produce more efforts cannot be known in advance. The use of 
temporary employees can be a source of profit or loss of productivity (Ichino and Riphahn, 
2005; Tsafack Nanfosso and Fomba Kamga, 2011). 
Empirically, the relationship between labour contract and corporate performance has been the 
subject of several studies. The first group of work focuses on the relationship between FTCs 
and the minimization of labour costs by using the production cost function. In this logic, Uzzi 
and Zoe (1998) have showed that the use of an ITC costs twice as much as using a FTC. 
Bentolila et al. (1994) indicate that an increase by 1% of the proportion of temporary workers 
reduces labour costs of 0.64% in private enterprises in the Italian manufacturing sector. 
 The second group of work concerned the relationship between FTCs and effort. Employee 
productivity is measured by effort, absenteeism and unpaid overtime. In this perspective, 
Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) using the absentee rate and unpaid overtime confirmed the 
positive relationship between temporary employees and effort incentive. Booth et al. (2002) 
by integrating the transition confirmed on a 7-year period that nearly 38% of temporary 
employees obtain an ITC at the end of their FTC. Moreover, while they are under a FTC, 
effort measured by unpaid overtime is higher than when they sign permanent contracts. In the 
same line, Ichino and Riphahn (2001) observed an increase in the absentee rate among the 
employees of Italian banks after the probationary period, which is accompanied in this 
country by a strong protection of employment. 
 
The third group of work measures the performance of the company by the production function 
in response to the shortcomings of financial performance.
2 The consideration of resources in 
the evaluation of performance is done via the production function; which establishes a 
relationship between the maximum output which can be produced and a set of inputs, given 
the existing level of technology of the firms. From this function are deduced average 
productivities of the different factors of production. This approach encounters at least two 
criticisms. The first is the fact that average productivity relates to only one factor, the others 
being ignored. On this basis, it becomes difficult to make a ranking of the companies when 
the rows are reversed from one factor to another. The second is the assumption that 
production units operate on their production frontier whereas they can be located in the entire 
production without being on the frontier.  
By taking into account the whole set of inputs and outputs at the same time, the calculation of 
the efficiency index makes it possible to mitigate these failures. These approaches have the 
                                                            
2 Financial measures enable a classification of companies based on their performance, do not communicate 
enough on the resources used.  advantage that in some cases they can help to obtain at the same time the productivity of the 
factors and efficiency index. With their values ranging between 0 and 1, these indexes make it 
possible to distinguish the most outstanding firms; i.e. those whose efficiency index are closer 
to the unit of the least impressive; i.e. those whose index are close to 0. The calculation of the 
efficiency index can be done from the nonparametric models or the parametric models.  
Non-parametric methods have the advantage of not requiring the specification of the 
functional form of the production function and their main disadvantage is their inability to 
assess the productivity of different inputs. One of the advantages of parametric methods is 
that they allow the obtainment of the index of efficiency of the firm and assesses the 
productivity of production factors. The heterogeneity of production factors, including labour 
inputs can therefore be taken into account. Mairesse and Cunot (1988), and Mairesse and 
Sassenou (1989) introduced the heterogeneity of labour across different socio-professional 
categories in the production function to assess productivity differences between employees in 
French industries. N'gbo Aké (1994), distinguishing employees based on their participation in 
the capital of French cooperatives and uses a Cobb-Douglas production function to assess 
productivity differentials between members staff and non members staff of French 
cooperatives.  
4.  Methodology  
The methodology adopted for this study is based on an econometric estimation of a 
production frontier whose functional form is specified in advance. Considering the fact that 
the variability of production is attributable to environmental factors which could not always 
be managed by firm, this study uses the stochastic frontier method. The stochastic frontiers 
method makes it possible to estimate a frontier function which simultaneously takes into 
account the random error and the inefficiency component, specific to every firm.  The stochastic production frontier method was initially proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), 
Meeusen and Van der Broeck (1977). Once a functional form has been chosen for the 
production function, the following model is adopted:  ( ) , ii yf x i β ε = + , where   is the 
output obtained by the firm i, 
i y
i x  is the vector of used inputs, β  is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated and  i ε  is a composed error with two elements,  ii vu i ε = + . 
The error component   represents the symmetric disturbance that captures the random  i v
variations in production due to factors such as random errors, errors in observation, data 
measurement and chance. This error component is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed as  ( )
2 0, v N σ . The error component   is an asymmetric term that  i u
captures technical inefficiency, and is assumed to be distributed independently of , and to  i v
satisfy . A statistical distribution for   has to be assumed. Aigner et al. (1977) analysed  0 i u ≤ i u
the cases of half-normal and exponential distributions. Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) 
considered only the latter. In this paper it will be assumed that the random error   is half- i u
normally distributed, since it better fits the available data. 
4.1.  Consideration of labour contract in modeling 
In spite of the numerous temporary contracts authorised by the 1992 Code, information 
provided by firms as well as those obtained from the National Institute of Statistics only 
distinguishes between employees under an ITC and those under a FTC. The theoretical 
framework used is the production theory because it is assumed that the firm is capable of 
transforming various inputs into output. The Cobb-Douglas specification is widely used 
because it generally represents a good description of the production process (Jorgensen, 
1972). In addition, algebraic manipulations are easier with the Cobb-Douglas function. 
Considering the two main production factors which are capital and labour, and adopting a 
Cobb-Douglas specification, the production function can be written as follows: 01 2 ln ln ln it it it it i yK L β ββ ν =+ + +− µ                                                                (1) 
Where   is the output of firm   at period t  ;  it y i it K measures the firm’s capital  at period , 
 measures the effective labour used by firm   at period   ; 
i t
it L i t β  indicates the vector of the 
production frontier to be estimated,   is the symmetric error term such as  it v
2 (0, ) it v vN σ →  ;  i µ  is the error term representing technical inefficiency and assumed 
invariant in time such that 
2 (0, ) i N µ σ → . Given that the labour force is made of 
employees whose labour contracts with the firm are different, the effective labour factor is 
split into two sub-groups which are: employees under ITC and those under FTC. 
ftc itc
it it it L NN δ =+                                                                                                                    (2) 
Where δ  measures a FTC equivalent in ITC. 01 δ < <  because it is assumed that employees 
under FTC are less productive than those under ITC. In equation (2)   and  itc
it N ftc
it N  are the 
number of workers under ITC and FTC in firm   at period   respectively. Let  i t ftc
it T  be the 








=                                                                                                                              (3) 
Let   be the number of ITC and FTC in firm   at period t , it’s expressed as follow:  it N i
ftc itc
it it it NN N =+                                                                                                                     (4) 
Substituting (4) in (2) the effective labour factor according to ,  it N ftc
it N  and δ  is given by: 
(1 ) ftc
it it it LN N δ =+ −                                                                                                               (5) 
Substituting (3) in (5) the expression of effective labour factor according to ,  it N ftc
it T  and δ  
is no expressed as: () 11 ftc
it it it LN T δ ⎡⎤ =+                                                                              (6) 
The linearization of this expression
−                            
⎣⎦
 gives: 
() ln ln ln 1 1 ftc
it it LN T δ ⎡⎤
it =+ + −
⎣⎦
                                                                                          (7) 
Assuming  ftc to be very small, the second term it T  of equation (7) is close to () 1 ftc
it T δ −
3 . 
Therefore, equation (7) now becomes: 
() ln ln 1 ftc LN T δ =+ −                                                                                                       (8)  it it it
Substituting (8) in (1), the production frontier function to be estim
ln
ftc
it it it it it N T
ated is given by: 
01 1 2 ln ln yK β β =+ + αα ε + +                                                                (9) 





 is therefore the relation between the marginal productivity of workers 
it it
yy ∂∂
under FTC and those under ITC and its expression is given by: 





=+                                                                                                                            (10) 
The number of temporary employees in the firm is subject to an economic calculation and can 
face particular constraints as shown in the literature review. Thus, the rate of temporary 
employees can’t be considered as an exogenous variable. To solve this problem, we purge out 
potential endogeneity between the rate of FTC employment and other variables. The second 
step consists in obtaining the predicted values of the rate of FTC employment in each firm. 
These values are inserted in equation (9) to replace the FTC variable. As the temporary 
employee rate in each firm is comprised between 0 and 1, its modelling is done using 
                                                           
4.2.  Endogeneity of the FTC Rate 
 
3 When  x  is small, ln(1 ) x x +≈ . truncated Tobit model. Variables used to estimate the determinants of precarious employees 
are discussed by Mangun et al. (1985), Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993), Betcherman et 
synthesis of these 
factors. 
Figure 1: Factors explaining the utilisation of temporary employment 
 














•  Fluctuation of demand 
•  Sector of activity 
•  Source of competition 
Firm’s internal factors 
1.  Variables linked to organisational flexibility : 
•  Proportion of unionised employees 
•  Proportion of trained employees 
•  Competitively factor 
 
•  Part of labour cost in exploitation charges 
Rate of employees with 
a precarious status. 
 
2.  Factors linked to the cost of labour: 
•  Size of the firm 




Source: Author from Mangun et al. (1985) and Byoung-Hoon Lee et al. (2005) 
4.3.  Data, Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used 
The data used in this paper comes from the survey entitled "Working conditions in the 
manufacturing industry in Cameroon" conducted in 2006 with funding from the African 
Economic Research Consortium (AERC) as part of the Collaborative PhD Programme. The 
survey focused on enterprises in the cities of Yaoundé and Douala with at least 15 employees. 
The quota sampling method is adopted to determine the number of firms and employees in 
each city and firm. The companies were selected from the directory of Cameroonian 
businesses available at the National Institute of Statistics (NIS). After processing the data, a 
sample of 65 companies and 1,809 employees was selected. Concerning this study, only 
information on 45 firms spread on 3 years (2003, 2004 and 2005) was used. This data was 
completed by information obtained from the National Institute of Statistics. Firms excluded 
from our analysis are those whose data were not available over the three-year study period. 
Retention rates are 78% for “employee questionnaires” and 80% for “company questionnaires”. The distribution of 65 firms surveyed shows that 29.24% of companies 
operate in the chemical sector, 23.07% in food and textile industries; 27.69% in the plastic 
and paper and 20% in the engineering sector. This distribution of 45 firms used in this paper 
9% in food and textile 
 of trained workers, the number of union strikes, staff expenses, syndicated 
on two consecutive periods, leads to “loose” variables and observations on 
one year. But, using the turnover index 
index is given by: 
shows that 28.89% of companies operate in the chemical sector, 28.8
industries; 28.89% in plastic and paper and 13.33% in the engineering sector. 
Definition and summary Statistics of the variables in the data Set 
Output is captured by the annual turnover of the firm expressed in CFA francs. For inputs, 
they include labour and capital (the value of the entire available fixed assets at the end of the 
fiscal year). In addition to these variables, we have the intensity of temporary employees’, the 
proportion
workers, sectors of activity, and the turnover index. The turnover index deserves a special 
attention. 
The turnover index captures fluctuations in demand. This variable verifies if variations in the 
demand of goods and services prompts employers to a greater use of workers with a 
precarious labour contract. As emphasized by Mangum and al. (1985), Abraham (1988) and 
Maniscalco (1995), measuring fluctuations in demand through the difference between 
demands observed 
avoids this scenario. The expression of the turnover 
1









 where  t y  is turnover at periodt.  _
  2 or  3 t turnover index y
tt + = ⎨ ==
The turnover index confirms the properties of a simple index and can be used in measuring 
the evolution of demand.  
Table 1 presents a summary of the variables used in this study. The average logarithm of 
turnover over the period is 21.1717 with a 17.6823 and 25.1891 being the minimum and 
maximum values, respectively. The logarithm of capital averaged 19.7856 with a maximum of 25.5222 which occurred in 2003 and the minimum of 12.9147 in 2004. The logarithm of 
the number of workers ranged from 2.1972 to 7.8180 with an average of 4.4615. Index of 
turnover is equal to 1 for every firm in 2003 and is ranged from 0.0875 to 17.5792 which 
indicate that some firms registered an increase in their turnover while others registered a 
decrease. The extreme values of the turn over index were observed for firms in the food 
industry. Average staff expenses range from 487.500 to 0.0422 million with an average of 
 staff expenses between firms is close 
to the overall variability of average staff expenses. This value was 11.502 millions.  
Table 1: Summary statistics for variables in data set 
143.204 millions. We observe that variability of average
Variable   Definition of 
variables 
Observations  Mean  S.D.  Min   Max  




























Log (Lt)  Logarithm of labour    4.4615  579 
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Rate of trained 
workers 
Proportion of trained 
workers. 
 0.2570 




























Strikes   strikes 
during the last five 
 0.4666 









Staff expenses  Average staff   143,204.5  77,973.74  42,272.92  487,500 






Source: Computed based on Survey and NIS data The number of strikes recorded during the last five years ranges from 0 to 4, and the 
variability of this number in the same company is null. 
Table 1, shows that some firms use exclusively temporary workers while others use only 
permanent workers. The average proportion of temporary workers is 0.4165 and the rate of 
variability of workers under FTC in firms is 0.0457. Also, the proportions of employees 
having received some training sponsored by the firm or being a member of a trade union vary 
 of 0.2570 and 0.3765 respectively. In general, typical gaps 
ile inter-firm variations are high. 
5. Results and discussions 
 identification problem. The 
 problems associated to holdup. 
between 0 and 1 with an average
show that intra-firm variations of variables are weak wh
5.1. Determinants of the intensity of FTC utilisation 
Among explanatory variables used to identify determinants of the temporary worker, only the 
variable logarithm of the number of workers is used to estimate production frontier. This 
indicates the identification of our model. The results for identifying determinants of the use of 
temporary workers are presented in Table 2. Results of the Tobit model are globally 
significant at 1% and six variables enable us to explain the intensity of temporary employees’ 
utilisation. These variables are: the membership rate, proportion of trained workers, average 
staff expenses, and firms located in Douala, the plastic and paper sector of activity and the 
metallic sector. Consequently, the model does not suffer from the
rate of unionization has a negative and significant effect on the utilization rate of temporary 
employees. However, this effect decreases at an increasing rate.  
These results close to those of Houseman (2001), justify the fact that the insiders limit the 
recruiting of precarious employees since they can reduce their power of negotiation. In the 
same way, it appears that when the proportion of trained employees increases, the intensity of 
the use of temporary employees decreases. Indeed, the increase of 1% of the rate of trained 
employees’ decreases by 45.88% the proportion of temporary employees used by the firms. 
This result justifies the fact that firms try to keep away fromIndeed, for firms to make profitable the investments carried out within the scope of training 
ted to sign ITC with them.  
t model of determinants of the intensity of FTC  
temporary employees can be inci
Table 2: Tobi  utilisation
Variables     FTC rate 
Log of labour  -0.0183 (-0.91) 
Index of turnover  0.0058 (1.37) 
Membership rate  -0.8754 (-2.88) * 
Squared membership rate  0.3978 (1.16) 
Proportion of trained workers  -0.2130 (-2.11) ** 
Average staff expenses  -7.10
-7 (-1.87) *** 
Union strike  0.0044 (0.14) 
Douala   -   0.1601 (-1.60) ***








-0.1794 (-2.34) ** 
-0.2452 (-2.67) * 





0.0598 (12.08) *    
0.8  * 
5 (7.52) * 
960 (28.54)






Number of period 
Log likelihood   98.827513 
Wald chi2 (10)  78.05 
135 
45 
Note:  1. t-statistics in parentheses. 
            2. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The increase in the level of wages and welfare benefits (measured by the average of staff 
expenses) decreases the use of temporary employees. This result is in conformity with those 
of Mangum and al. (1985), Harrison and Kelley (1993), and of Abraham and Taylor (1996). 
Indeed, the more the company offers labour wages and competitive welfare benefits, the more 
it will tend to resort to atypical labour contracts. The idea of the reduction of the salary costs 
is thus confirmed.  
The companies located in the town of Douala (relatively to those located in Yaoundé) have a 
low propensity to use temporary employees. It is the same for industries in the plastic and 
paper sector, and the metal sector. This result can be justified by the fact that firms in this sector have a stable activity, that is, less subjected to competition or that the qualifications 
required for its operation requires that employments be stable. From this estimate, we obtain 
the predicted values of the intensity of temporary employees’ utilization. These predicted 
values are used in the estimation of the production frontier. 
5.2. Employees’ productivity 
Table 3 reports the uncorrected Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) averaged-firm 
model
4, the corrected MLE averaged-firm model, the uncorrected production frontier function 
estimates and the corrected production frontier func sing ST nd  tion estimates u ATA software a
maximum likelihood method. The values of µ  are statistically equal to zero and the variance 
statistically different from zero, insuring that  ( )
2 0, i N µ µ σ →  and  (0, ) it v vN
2 σ → as 
indicated in the methodology. The individual coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas stochastic 
frontier production function and of the Cobb-Douglas MLE averaged-firm model production 
function are directly interpretable as partial elasticities of the mean value of output with 
respect to inputs. They permit the evaluation of the impact of a change in the quantity of an 
input on output. Partial elasticity values obtained indicate the relative importance of labour 
and capital in the firm’s total production. It can be observed from Table 3 that the factor 
                                                           
capital is more important than labour in the firm’s production. This result isn’t surprising 
since the manufacturing sector implies transformation, therefore necessitating more capital. 
The parameter indicating returns to scale vary from 1.3106 for uncorrected MLE averaged-
firm model production function estimates to 1.3208 for corrected stochastic frontier 
production function. This value being mathematically greater than one but statistically equal 
 
4 In this esti , the tempo
d effects. Moreo -firm variations a e weaker than inter-firm 
ers  nge much from on riod to another. 
mation ral dimension is weak. In such a case, the results of the model with random effects 
are better than those the model with fixe ver, intra r
variations of variables and temporary work use rate does not cha e peto one
5 indicates constant returns to scale in firm production. The implication of such a result 
is that, doubling the amount of each input results in a doubling in the quantity produced. This 
result further reveals that manufacturing firms cannot benefit from economy of scale linked to 
increasing returns in order to boost production. Different results were obtained by Ajibefun et 
al. (1996), Ajibefun and Daramola (2003) in their studies on smallholder croppers and 
e microenterprises in the Nigerian economy and by Nchare (2005) in his study on coffe  
producers in Cameroon. 
Differences in productivity between ITCs and FTCs can be analysed through the δ  
coefficient, obtained from  2 α  and  2 β  as shown in equation (10). The variables Labour and 
rate of FTC are jointly significant at 1% as shown in table 3 although partial elasticity of rate 
of FTC is insignificant. We can therefore compute the differences in productivity between 
ITC and FTC. Results of δ  are reported in the last line of Table 3. The values of δ  vary from 
2.2270 for uncorrected MLE averaged-firm model production function estimates to 2.2362 for 
corrected stochastic frontier production function estimated. δ  is always greater than one. 
These results show that employees’ holders of FTC are twice more productive than that 
holding ITC and the difference in productivity is greater when firm operates on the frontier 
production function, and estimations are corrected from endogeneity of rate of temporary 
employees used by the firm. 








production frontier function is 0.7595 for uncorrected stochastic production frontier function 
estimates and 0.7624 for corrected stochastic productio
=  of the Cobb-Douglas stochastic 
n frontier function estimates. Their 
                                                              
5 The hypothesis test HH 0 122 1 122 :1 / :1 β α ++ β β αβ = ++≠ =
 et χ = rrected  d OLS and co tic 
ontier functio i is 
 shows that  2 χ ,  2 0.35 χ = ,  1 0.72 1
2
1 0.72 χ = 2
1 0.36 for unco OLS, correcte , uncorrected  rrected stochas
production fr n, meaning that  0 H   s accepted that  122 1 β αβ + += . values are not close to e signif erent fro % level. This finding 
suggests some technical inefficiency in firm production.  
r the par eters of the stochastic production frontier  
 one and ar icantly diff m zero at 1
Table 3: MLE fo am
Variables   Uncorrected OLS  OLS estimation  Cor tic  Uncorrected  rected Stochas
estimation  stochastic frontier 
production 
frontier production 
Log (labour)  0.3682 (3.93)  0.3732 (3.94) *  0.3679 (3.91) *  0.3729 (3.93) * 
Log (capital)  0.4906 (9.21) *  0.4867 (8.88) *  0.4908 (9.19) *  0.4869 (8.85) * 
FTC/labour  0   0   0.4531 (1.34)  0.4610 (0.92) *  .4518 (1.34) .4590 (0.92)
Constant  9.6334 (9.82) *  9.6797 (8.91) *  11  *  12  *  .9873 (5.63) .0742 (5.33)
Number of observation 
Sigma square 
 
0.64 ) * 
 
0.65 ) * 
0.3633 (13.10) * 
2.3568 (1.28) 
0.54 ) * 
0.4158 (4.09) * 
316 (6.60) * 
595 (13.77) * 
2.3981 (1.24) 
0.55 ) * 
0.4234 (4.03) * 
0.1320 (6.55) * 
0.7624 (13.67) * 
Number of firms 

























0.7590 (13.87) * 
 




Log likelihood  




Return to scale  1.3106  1.3189  1.3118  1.3208 
Wald test for joint  chi2 ( 2) =   17.02 *  chi2 (2) =   15.85 *  chi2 (2) =   16.97 *  chi2 (2) =   15.79 * 
significance of labour 
terms 
                        
δ   2.2270 2.2299  2.2316  2.2362 
Note:  1. t-statistics in parentheses. 
            2. * represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
The efficiency index obtained from estimating the model represented by equation (9) using 
maximum likelihood method is grouped together in Table A4 in the appendix. They vary from 
one firm to another and range from 0.0256 to 0.5774 for uncorrected model with a mean of 
0.1218 and from 0.0216 to 0.5723 for corrected model with a mean of 0.1136. According to 
ese results, more than 80% of firm output is lost, on average, due to the specific 
rison of efficiency index between different 
ectors sh t  ica   an l i   ap  s  
ency  in  r od el th rrected m he
erefore as en
th
inefficiencies pertaining to firms. The compa
s ows tha chem l, food and mech ica ndustries have  proximately the ame
effici levels  the cor ected m el as w l as in  e unco odel. T  plastic sector 
is th  the le t effici t.   
 Table 4: D ti f y b r istribu on of e ficienc y secto s 
  From un  m corrected odel  From c  m orrected odel 
 C   M   C   Mechanic   hemical Food  Plastic    echanic All  hemical Food  Plastic   All 
Mean  0.1387 0.1286  0.077715 0.1375 0.1180 0.1340  0.1218  0.0752  0.1347      0.1136 
SD 0.1364  0.0755  0.033925  0.0601  0.0914 0.1356 0.0682  0.0330 0.0595 0.0890 
Min 0.0412  76  0.0256  0.0429  0.0256 0.0389 0.0467  0.0216 0.0381 0.0216  0.04
Max 0.5774  0.3436  0.1494  0.2304  0.5774 0.5723 0.3054  0.1400 0.2091 0.5723 
Quartile 1  0.0453  0.0848  0.0606  0.1162  0.0628 0.0439 0.0729  0.0559 0.1136 0.0590 
Quartile 2  0.1101  0.1050  0.0725  0.1263  0.1050 0.1008 0.1098  0.0704 0.1231 0.0961 
Quartile 3  0.1600  0.1526  0.0884  0.1831  0.1405 0.1469 0.1480  0.0871 0.2015 0.1400 
Source: Computed based on Survey and NIS data 
The study of the effects of employment contracts on the performance of manufacturing firms 
in Cameroon was made with a sample of 45 firms observed over three years. To do this, a 
two-step methodology was adopted with a view to correct the endogeneity of usage rate of 
precarious employees. The first step was to analyze the determinants of the usage of 
precarious employees and the obtainment of the predicted value of the utilization of 
precarious employees. In the second step, the estimation of the stochastic frontier of 
production function was done using the predicted values of precarious employees use rate. 
This methodological approach was used to calculate (i) the productivity differential between 
the two types of employees, (ii) returns to scale, and (iii) efficiency levels of firms in the 
sample. 
Empirical results showed that precarious employees are two twice more productive than 
permanent employees. Returns to scale are constant and firms are technically inefficient. 
Efficiency index values range from 0.02 to 0.57 for the unadjusted model and 0.03 to 0.58 for 
the adjusted model. The average efficiency index is statistically the same in the chemical, 
food and mechanical sectors and is therefore lower in the plastics industry. Industries of the 
manufacturing sector can therefore increase their production by more than 80% on average if 
they are on their efficiency frontier. Based on these results, further studies are needed to 
6.  Conclusion determine the factors explaining the ineffectiveness of the manufacturing sector. However, it 
and employers’ short-term adjustment 
on of 
ng 
and, Armidale, Australia. 
n Economic Research Consortium. 
dies, 57: 381--402. 
ons from Spain’, Economic Policy, 54--99. 
is essential to note that these companies must improve their managerial skills in order to 
obtain increased return to scale in order to have their size grow alongside their performance.  
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Année  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06 
Primaire  23.85 26.32 25.71 25.58 27.16 27.86 26.75 24.42 24.24 24.34 23.96 23.85 26.32 25.71 
Secondaire  37.41 35.71 98 34 33.75 31.91 35.18 73 65 35.20 33.77 37.41 5.7 33  33.  32.  39.  35.  3 1  .98 
Tertiaire  38.74 .97 .31 .08 .09 .23 .07 .86 .11 .47 .27 .7 . 0  37  40  42  39  40  38  35  40  40  42  38 4 37 97 4 .31 
Total  100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0  100 100   10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10   10  
Growth GDP    2.06 4.13 4.91 5.31 4.90 4.06 4.17 4.51 4.01 4.03 3.70 2.30 3.22 
Source: ts of Cam  National Accoun eroon Table A2: Changes in employment by industry 
Année  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06 
Secteur  Primaire  60.3 60.8 61.1 63.4 65.7 64.9 63.6 63.1 62.6 62.7 63.0  63.0  62.0  62 
Secteur 
secondaire 
12.4 12.5 11.7 11.5 11  11 10  11.3 11.2 11.4 11.7 11.8 11.4 11.5 
Secteur  tertiaire   2 24 22 23.6 24.8 24.5 24.9   2 26 27    28.4 28.0 7.5  .9  .6  25.6 5.6    28
Total  100.0 100.0 1 10 10 00. 0.0 100.0  0   1 10 00 0  00.0  0.0  0.0 1 0 10 100. 100.0 00.0  0  1  10
Source: Nation cc ts of Cam n.
Table A3: Changes in employment structure (in %) 
al A oun eroo  
Year  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  05 
Public sector  6.2  6.0  5.6 4.6  4.0 3.7 3.6  3.5 3.1  2.8  2.8  4.9 
Private sector   93.8  94.0  94.4 95.4  96.0 96.3 96.4  96.5 96.9  97.2  97.2  95.1 
Formal   11.3  9.4 4.3 4.1  5.9  4.7  11.8  6.7  7.0  2.9 3.9  6.3 
Informal  88.2  93. 0  .1 7  3  93. 88.7  90.6 95.7 95.9  97.1 96   93. 94.1  90.4 
Self-employmen 4  60.8  0 6 9 59 59.2  59.2  60.2  6 -  t  64. 61. 4.2  62. .2  58.6  0.2 
Source: National Accounts of Came 993 - 2 3 and E 2005) 
Table A4: Technical efficiencies of le firm
 correcte odel  orrected model 
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Mean  0.1180  0.1136 
Source: Computed based on Survey and NIS data 
 